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This research was designed and conducted in order to examine the role of 
cheap talk communication in decision making process, especially when 
people have to make a decision collectively.  People face myriads of 
matters which need to be decided in their daily lives and during this process, 
information plays a pivotal role.  Then what would be the most effective 
way of obtaining a piece of information?  Many people try to obtain 
information indirectly, using information shortcut such as discussion with 
people with better knowledge.  The impact of communication among 
individuals as the means of managing information, however, has not been 
studied widely comparing to the interest from the media and the mass.  
This research tries to study communication in the three-person Battle 
of the Sexes game.  The aim is to verify the effect of communication 
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network structures to group decision making using experimental methods 
based on behavioral formal model.  By using experimental method, the 
analysis of causal inference between information and decision making, 
strategic choice of the player and the actual effect will be analyzed.  
Specifically, the study tries to find out how players make decisions under 
asymmetric information status.  The subjects of the experiment are to play 
three-person Battle of the Sexes game of choosing between two options.  
They would get paid off when all of the three people in one group choose the 
same option.  However, the amount of the profit following coordination is 
various depending on the type of the players which is given randomly by the 
computer when each period starts.  Before making a decision between two 
options, participants have an opportunity to communicate with each other 
according to one of four communication network structures.  
The analysis focuses on the information management process.  
Which would be more significant and advantageous, to have higher level of 
information, or to have the power of disseminating information?  In some 
network structures, there exist “the hubs” who have more connection with 
people from others.  Depending on the structures, these hubs gain more 
information about the type of the others and/or have an opportunity to let 
others know about their own plan or type.  The result shows that for group 
coordination, the ability to influence others is most beneficial.   
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It is also shown that more communication brings higher coordination 
rate.  Although the subjects were under asymmetrical payoff function, they 
were willing to cooperate for the group coordination.  When the decision 
making is done at the individual level, as the previous studies has already 
asserted, it is important to obtain information needed at the lowest cost as 
possible.  In this case, the people having large amount of knowledge or 
available shortcuts would have advantage.  However, when it comes to 
group decision, and when my possibilities of gaining profit is also depending 
on other’s choice, the situation changes.  Rather than information itself, the 
way information is delivered become more important.  This is the point this 
research tried to suggest: the importance of information sharing networks to 
making decision.   
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1. Background Questions 
 
People face myriads of matters which need to be decided in their daily lives 
and during this decision-making process, information plays a pivotal role.  
When a man tries to buy a jar of jam, for example, he may have hard time 
choosing one because he confronts a tremendous collection of jam with 
various kinds in the supermarket.  He would choose one to his taste by 
using the information – this could have been obtained from the experience of 
eating jam before, from the advertisement, or any advice from the friend who 
knows everything about jam.   
Similarly, when voters choose a candidate to throw their vote in the 
election, they make a decision on the basis of information.  The information 
would be such as the candidates’ personal characters, capabilities, possibility 
of winning or perspective on specific issues, and can be obtained by one’s 
personal experience and knowledge, from the media, or from other people 
having high interests in politics.  What would be the most effective way of 
obtaining a piece of information?   
The problem is, the amount of information each voter possess varies, 
and the cost he needs to pay in order to obtain additional piece of 
2 
 
information also varies vastly (Downs 1957).  Therefore, many people try 
to obtain information indirectly, using information shortcut (Lupia 1994) 
such as discussion with people with better knowledge.  That would be 
cheaper since not everyone have ability or willingness to actively study the 
topic himself.  This way of information obtaining became more important 
because nowadays, development of technology let people use Social 
Network Services to communicate actively.  The impact of communication 
among individuals as the means of managing information, however, has not 
been studied widely comparing to the interest from the media and the mass.  
 Specifically how can communication play a role as the way of 
sharing information?  Table 1 is the payoff matrix of a young couple 
choosing what to do when they go out.  They have two options: the movie 
or the baseball.  
1           2 Movie Baseball 
Movie 5,2 0,0 
Baseball 0,0 2,5 
 
Table 1. A Battle of the Sexes Game 
  
Player 1 prefers to go to the movie than go to the baseball park.  On 
the other hand, player 2 prefers to go see baseball than going to the movie.  
However, the important thing is, both prefer to meet each other at the same 
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place than go to the favorite place alone.  This is the typical Battle of the 
Sexes game.  A Battle of the Sexes game is one of the typical coordination 
games, which is symmetric game that has two pure-strategy nash equilibria 
and a symmetric mixed-strategy nash equilibrium.  Here the pure-strategy 
equilibrium is (Movie, Movie) and (Baseball, Baseball).  The mixed-
strategy equilibrium would be player 1 choosing Movie with the possibility 
5/7, and choosing Baseball with possibility 2/7: and player 2 choosing vice 
versa.  The problem is, without communication between two, the players 
cannot tell what pure strategy to choose since this is a symmetric condition.   
But what if the player 1 has the chance to send a message to the 
player 2?  Player 1 would text a message “let’s go to the movie” and the 
player 2 would prefer to go to the movies rather than they end up in different 
place although the movie is not his/her most preferred choice.  Therefore in 
this case, the communication can actually convey meaningful information, 
and brings the coordination success.  What would happen, however, the 
player 1 and the player 2 send a message to each other at the same time?  
The result would not much successful than the first case.  They may not 
meet at the same place if there message indicates different places.  This 
phenomenon was actually verified in a lot of experiment literature (for 
example, Cooper et al. 1989).  
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Yet what meaning does this presumption have? This is an important 
problem in game-theoretic world.  This kind of communication, i.e., cheap 
talk, was not considered as the alternative to the coordination failure 
extensively at first.  Counting out the game theoretic explanation, there is a 
significant flaw in the communication: that it is difficult to assume a group 
of people communicating under the same circumstances.  However, as 
people find more and more way to share information and communicate each 
other throughout the web, communication as the way of obtaining 
information becomes more important.   
     
2. Research Outline 
 
This research tries to study communication in the three-person Battle of the 
Sexes game.  The aim is to verify the effect of communication network 
structures to group decision making using experimental methods based on 
behavioral formal model.  By using experimental method, the analysis of 
causal inference between information and decision making, strategic choice 
of the player and the actual effect will be able to be analyzed.   
Specifically, the study tries to find out players making decisions 
under asymmetric information status.  The subjects of the experiment are to 
play three-person Battle of the Sexes game of choosing between two options.  
They would get paid off when all of the three people in their group choose 
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the same option.  However, the amount of the profit following coordination 
is various depending on the type of the players which is given randomly by 
the computer when each period starts.  Before making a decision between 
two options, participants have an opportunity to communicate with each 
other according to one communication network structures shown in Figure 1. 
There are four kinds of communication networks in this experiment.  
Complete network is the network in which all players simultaneously 
exchange the message.  Star-in network is the network in which two players 
give information to one specific player.  In Star-out network, on the other 
hand, one player sends information to other two.  Then in Two-links 
network, there is one player connected to others, and exchange information 
respectively.    
The study focuses on the information management process.  
Everybody knows that the information is important.  However, which 
would be more significant and advantageous, to have higher level of 
information, or to have the power of disseminating information?  This is not 
easy to answer.  In some network structures, there exist “the hubs”who have 
more connection with people from others.  Depending on the structures, 
these hubs gain more information about the type of the others and/or have an 
opportunity to let others know about their own plan (or type).  Which would 
earn the hub more profit after all?  Which would be helpful for coordination 
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success of a group?  These questions would be answered throughout the 
experiment.   
 




II. Theoretical Background 
 
In this chapter the review on the previous researches on cheap talk, network 
in political science, and experimental methodology will be given.   
 
1. Game Theoretic Models of Cheap Talk 
 
In the perspective of classical game theory, cheap talk, the pre-play 
communication with no binding force or effect to the payoff function, is 
thought not to affect the result of the game.  This view is well shown in the 
word itself – the word “cheap talk” is from the saying “Talk is cheap.”  
Some economists like Crawford, Farell, or Rabin, however, had some 
different views.  They have proven that communication by cheap talk can 
actually affect the result of the game.  In these kinds of studies, cheap talk 
has been suggested as an alternative to coordination failure.  
Crawford and Sobel(1982) did a pioneering research making game 
theoretic model of cheap talk conveying private information.  They showed 
that costless, non-binding message can convey information as much as the 
preferences of the players coincide.  Their model has a sender who has the 
private information, and a receiver who receives a message from the sender 
and then makes a decision.  In this case, how honestly would the sender 
convey the private information he gathered?  According to Crawford and 
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Sobel, this relies on the difference between the preferences of two players.  
If the preferences do not overlap at all, there exists a babbling equilibrium in 
which messages have no meaning and the receiver ignores them.  So they 
introduced a partition equilibrium.  They divide the parts of sender giving 
the private information, and they see that in each part the signal sent is the 
same, so more overlapped preferences between the sender and the receiver 
would mean more partition and the receiver would receive better information.  
Farell (1987) showed how non-binding costless communication can 
achieve a partial coordination in the industrial entry model.  Here the 
equilibrium in which two players play one kind of battle of the sexes game 
after one time or twice communication.  He concluded that cheap talk 
partially help to coordinate when the multiple pure-strategy equilibrium is 
preferred.   
After, Farell and Rabin (1996) refute the existing theory on 
transmission of private information in that most cases of the information 
sharing in reality is done by simple unofficial conversation, i.e. cheap talk 
and neither by costly signaling like Spence asserted nor incentive mechanism 
like Hurwicz insisted.  
Some scholars divide cheap talk study in two parts according to the 
content of information the cheap talk conveys.  So the cheap talk in game 
can be divided into (a) cheap talk that transfer private information of a player, 
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and (b) pre-play communication that shows which action a player would 
choose.  This research may use both definitions since the cheap talk here 
indicates pre-play communication under asymmetric information like in 
Guarnaschelli et al. (2000).  
 
2. Experimental Methodology 
 
Experimental studies of cheap talk have been focused on coordination games 
or negotiation games based on theories mentioned above.  These kinds of 
literature specify factors such as the direction of the communication (one-
way, or two-way) and whether the players should break the equilibrium to 
have better result.  According to those studies, one-way communication is 
effective when breaking the equilibrium brings better results.  For instance, 
in one study, in the battle of the sexes game, one-way communication 
succeeds to coordinate (mainly to the sender’s preferred equilibrium) yet 
two-way communication showed 55% of success rate, and when there is no 
communication among the players, the success rate was 41%.  On the other 
hand, when the player has no incentive to break the equilibrium (e.g. Stag-
Hunt game), two-way communication was more effective (Cooper et al. 
1989; 1992).  
 Van Huyck et al. (1992) studied how effective it is to provide non-
binding public equilibrium (public equilibrium is an equilibrium that every 
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players can have information about it, not between some players.).  In this 
case, when efficient or fair equilibrium is provided the coordination rate was 
very high; when the provided equilibrium is inefficient or unfair, the rate was 
very low.   
  Blume et al. (1998) tested the case of partial common interest among 
players.  In this study, there were three kinds of private information and five 
actions for players.  The result was the similar: if there is any (partial) 
common interest, (limited) communication happens.  It was difficult, 
however, to bring further rule in this experiment.  Duffy and Feltovich 
(2002) tested which is more effective to make coordination, observation of 
past action of the players or the cheap talk.  There were three games: 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, Stag-Hunt, Chicken game and the effective way 
depends on the type of game.  
 
1           2 C D 
C 70, 70 10, 55 
D 55, 10 55, 55 
 
Table 2. Stag-Hunt Game 
 
1           2 C D 
C 70, 70 10, 80 
D 80, 10 40, 40 
 




1           2 C D 
C 70, 70 50, 80 
D 80, 50 40, 40 
 
Table 4. Chicken Game 
 
 However, there are not a lot of researches done with the network 
structure itself.  Therefore this study aims to bring communication 
structures and decision making problem into political context which was 
mainly in the economic context, and make an experiment of decision making 
model of people with different, or partial common interest.  Especially this 
study is influenced by following two studies.  First of all, Choi et al. (2011) 
found out how network structure influences the decision making of the 
players in the three-person Public Good game.  This research tests similar 
network structures, yet testing Battle of the Sexes game so the people may 
receive different payoff to the same group decision.  Also there is the study 
of Choi and Lee (2009) that studies how the fairness and effectiveness can be 
achieved depending on communication networks of four-person Battle of the 
Sexes game.  In this study, they have networks like Complete network that 
the players are all connected; Star network that has one hub, Line network 
that the players connected in one line; Kite network that three people are 
connected and one player is just connected to the hub.  The players 
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exchange messages two or more times.  On the other hand, in this research, 
four-person game is simplified to three-person game, and the payoff function 
is separated from the location on the network structure, so the preference 
treatment is newly introduced.   
 
3. Network Studies in Political Science 
 
In political science, network is mostly studied in the context of voting 
behavior.  In one of the most influential studies of voting behavior, 
Berelson et al. (1954) argue that social contexts such as where he lives, 
which social groups he belongs do matter.  They further argue that it is 
because individual’s interpersonal networks are built based on the shared 
political preferences that are relatively homogeneous. They conclude that 
network formation is characterized by homophily. According to them, an 
individual’s political preference is largely shaped by the social contexts 
around him and eventually is strengthened by the homogeneous discussion 
network. 
Huckfeldt and Sprague also reconfirm that homophily is observed in 
network formation (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995).  Despite the homophily 
tendency, they also note that even among the seemingly homogenous 
network arises constant political disagreements and also, despite the 
continuous disagreements the discussions usually neglects the socially minor 
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perspectives. They used snowball sampling to check if a respondent’s 
perceived preferences of discussants in his network actually correspond to 
the discussants’ actual preferences. Using this research design, they could 
explain how important perception bias is. 
Mutz’s approach has a different perspective (Mutz 2002).  She 
acknowledges that although there is homophily, individual preferences 
cannot be completely homogenous therefore at least on some occasions, 
disagreements occur inevitably. Second, these political disagreements among 
interpersonal discussion network have a significant importance in normative 
perspectives, such as tolerance.  Later, Mutz and Mondak argue that 
individuals can have cross-cutting network where individual’s selection 
criteria is not related to political preferences, such as work place (Mutz and 
Mondak 2009). 
However, recent research (Huckfeldt 2001; T.K.Ahn et al. 
Forthcoming) argue otherwise saying that the most important variable in 
network formation is not based on a mutual political preference but rather on 
the level of political expertise a discussant shows. Downs further argue that 
this is the grounds on which ‘rational’ voters base their network formation 
(Downs 1957).  Even if a voter shares relatively similar political 
preferences with a discussant, if the discussant does not have any political 
expertise, the voter will not benefit any relevant information. 
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The question regarding which factors decide network formation has 
a significant meaning in normative perspectives.  If a network shows 
extreme homophily in its formation, citizens can be polarized (Sunstein 
2009), can be less tolerant (Mutz 2002), and so on.  On the other hand, if 
political expertise is most important factor in network formation, there can 
be ‘self-educating’ electorate (T.K. Ahn et al. Forthcoming).  Citizens as 
individuals have little incentive to seek information therefore may end up 
with small amount of information (Downs 1957; Popkin 1994), but citizens 
as whole can be ‘rational public’ in this case. 
Previous researches argue that the social contexts and interpersonal 
discussion networks have independent effects on political participation, 
political preferences, and voting decisions (Bek et al. 2002; Berelson et al. 
1954; Bond 2012; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Knoke 1990; McClurg 2006; 
T.K.Ahn et al. Forthcoming).  However, there is disagreement on whether 
social contexts directly influence individuals’ political attitudes or if they 
only have indirect effects.  Mutz and Mondak argue that social contexts 
influence how discussion networks are formed, but do not have any direct 
effect on political attitudes (Mutz and Mondak 2009).  Huckfeldt and 
Sprague say that social contexts can have indirectly effect on political 
attitudes by influencing the formation of networks, but also can directly 
influence political attitudes. 
15 
 
Previous researches confirmed that the positive information 
networks that consists of each candidate’s supporters has a substantial effect 
on a discussant’s political preferences and voting decisions, but on the 
another hand, said nothing on the negative information network that 
consisting of each candidate’s opponents.  However, the fact that negative 
information has more credibility and therefore is more influential compared 
to positive information (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1997), and also the fact 
that ‘negative voting’ is a frequent phenomenon (Fiorina and Shepsle 1989), 






III. The Setup 
 
1. Research Models  
 
The basic model of the experiment is a three-player coordination game 
making decisions between two actions.  Before the players decide, they 
share information by exchanging messages according to several network 
structures.  Here the message would be costless, non-binding cheap talk.  
If all three players choose one same action, they get the payoff; otherwise, 
they do not get any.  To be specific, there are two models, mainly similar 
but different in preferences of the players.  To make the models easier to 
understand, they will be explained as choosing a candidate to cast the vote 
considering the situation in the voting context.  Therefore the first model 
can be called partisan voter model, since the players within this model are 
passionate partisans of each candidate.  In the second model, there exists a 
swing voter-type player, so they do not care which candidate is elected as the 
result of a group’s decision.  In these models, the players have the benefit of 
coordination success – that means election of the least preferred candidate 





A. Model 1: Partisan Voter Model 
 
In this model, each group consists of three players.  The player is 
 ∈ {1,2,3}.  Each player is given a type and there are two kinds of type: T = 
{A, B}.  The type shows the player’s preference.  One’s type is only 
known to the player oneself, and others cannot know (private information).  
The players simultaneously and independently choose an action – or, a 
candidate –  ∈ { , }.  If all three players choose the same one action, 
they get paid off (unanimity rule).  The amount of payoff each player 
receives, however, is different depending on the type of the players.  Player 
i receives higher payoff if the group’s decision is same with one’s own type.  
Each player’s action would be   = (  ,   ,   ).  Then player i’s payoff 
  ( ) would be as follows: 
  ( ) =  
0	  	  ≠   	   	    	 ≠  
  	  	  =   ≠   	   	   	 ≠  
  	  	  =   =   	   	   	 ≠  
 
  >   > 0 
   
Therefore this game is a three-person Battle of the Sexes game.  
This is a game of choosing a place to hang out, or a candidate to work for the 
group.1  
                                         
1 Like in the reality, although absolute benefit from the coordination is guaranteed, 
there are people who benefit more than others from the decision (or less).  What 
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 Yet before making the decision, players are to communicate with 
each other according to the network structure, which is given when each 
period of the experiment begins.  The structure of communication network 
is a common knowledge, known to every player.  To be specific, players are 
sending message  ∈ { , }  following arrows in the structures.  This 
message does not necessarily indicate the action the sender would choose 
afterwards (no binding), and it is costless.2  The content of the message is 
only known to the receiver.   
 This model is quite straightforward, and the players’ behavior can be 
predicted as follows.  Three players are to vote for A or B.  If all three 
votes for one candidate, the group coordination succeeds and the players 
would get positive payoffs; the coordination success brings the members 
some profit.  Yet each player is divided to A type endorsing A, or B type 
endorsing B.  A-type player would get higher payoff if A is selected as 
group coordination result, and B-type player would if B is selected.  
Therefore each type of players has incentives to make others to choose their 
own preferred action.  This is also like a committee meeting hiring a 
professor.  Two of them votes for A and one of them votes for B.  Under 
                                                                                                         
would be interesting in the experiment is how people may react when it comes to 
the problem of relative benefit. 
2 This makes the message a cheap talk. 
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the unanimity rule, then, both candidates cannot be hired.  However, the 
committee would be better off if the place is filled; so they can communicate 
(in a limited way) before the one-shot voting.   
 If the three players are all the same type, there would be no problem 
since the result would be obvious.  What would happen if there are both 
type A and type B in the same group?  Then the possibility that coordination 
naturally happens is very low.  Here is where the cheap talk works.   
 The players are not bound to their previous message when they 
make a final choice, however, the network structure and the game left no 
incentive for the players to lie or hide their types from others in the 
perspective of profit-making.   
 
B. Model 2: Swing Voter Model 
 
However, in real world, not everyone has strong opinions on every matter 
(since it is not always easy to know what one really wants to do oneself).  
In this model, there are also three players in one group playing a three-person 
Battle of the Sexes game.  Like above, the payoff function and the network 
structure is common knowledge, and the type of the player and the content of 
the message is private knowledge.  However, in this model, there is an 
additional type of player so there are three types of players: T = {A, B, S}.  




 ( ) =  
0	  	  ≠   	   	    	 ≠  
  	  	  =   	   	   	 ≠  
 
  >   >   > 0 
In other words, this player S receives payoff when all the players in the 
group choose the same action, but is indifferent of which action is selected.  
When the period begins, the players are given type A with possibility p, type 
S with possibility q, and type B with possibility (1-p-q).  Each player 
simultaneously and independently chooses action/candidate  ∈ { , } and 
get paid when the three ends up in coordination. 
 Players are to communicate before making a decision, according to 
the network structures given at the beginning of a session.  The network 
structures are same with the model 1; there are four kinds of communication 
networks.  Players send a message,  ∈ { ,  } and the message does not 
necessarily indicate the sender’s action in the future (non-binding), and 
costless.  Type S player would also send a message saying either A or B.   
 Player S, the new type, would be compared to a swing voter in the 
voting context.  This type of player always benefits from coordination 
success, but is indifferent with the result unlike A and B.  Yet S’s payoff is 
lower than the selected action’s supporters and higher than the opponents.   
 In model 2, we may take a closer look at two-way communication.  
In this model, S player send a message, either A or B, so the message only 
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partially accord to the sender’s interest.  Then in Star network with one-way 
communication, for example, the distribution of types would affect more 
than the message of the player.  In Figure 3-1, coordination is unlikely after 
the communication.  However, in 3-2, the swing voter player may have 




2. Network Structures 
 
For the case of three player communication, there are more possibilities of 
communication rather than just one-way or two-way communication.  This 
research selected four kinds of structures of communication network as 
shown in Figure 1.  In Complete network for example, three players – 
decision makers – exchange the information equally.  However, symmetric 
communication may not be the most efficient way of sharing information as 
mentioned.  Then more amount of information does not always help make a 
Figure 2. Type Distribution and Networks in Model 2 
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decision and then succeed into equilibrium.  Rather, Star-out or Star-in 
network would be more successful in the perspective of successful 
coordination (Figure 3).  Especially this Star networks stands for the 
communicating situation in real life because in reality, the individuals are 
connected asymmetrically in the communication networks.  In Star-out 
network, the hub, sending messages to the other two players can be called an 
opinion leader.  The other two players may have the same preference with 
the opinion leader or not, and this would also change the result of decision 
making process.  On the other hand, in Star-in network, one player receives 
information from two players respectively.  In this case, if the sender has 
the same preference, the decision would not be difficult to make.  However, 
if not, what would the players choose to do?  This research aims to answer 
these questions. 
 
Figure 3. Star-in and Star-out Network 
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IV. Experimental Design 
 
1. Why the experiment: the methodology 
 
To test the models above, the experimental methodology was selected.  
Although lab experiment may have to sacrifice some sense of direct 
applicability, it is the most useful means of measuring the interaction among 
the players without unwanted intervention: the strength of experiment using 
computer is to minimize the interaction of the researcher and the participants 
and therefore prevent arbitrary intervention of the researcher and bias.  
Moreover, since anonymity at decision making is guaranteed, researcher can 
control the communication among participants and control the various 
environmental factors which can affect decision.  The experiment was 
programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007).  
z-Tree connects experiment conductor’s computer and participants’ computer 




In this experiment, there are two main treatments: communication network 





A. Communication Network Structures 
 
 
Figure 4. Four Kinds of Network Structures 
 
As we have seen in Figure 1, there are four kinds of communication 
networks.  The subjects are to play 10 periods of non-communication 
making decision games first, and this will be the baseline of the experiment.  
Also, this would prepare the participants to understand the more complex 
communication game.  There would be four sessions over all and in each 
session, the subjects would play 10 periods of no-communication games, and 
then 40 periods of communication game according to one of four network 
structures in Figure 4.  This communication game played for 40 periods 
consists of two stages: communication stage and voting stage.  In the 
Complete network session, all the three players in a group should send each 
other a message.  On the other hand, in the Star-out network, the person in 
the location X only sends the message to Y and Z.  This location is assigned 
by the computer randomly when each period begins.  The participants do 
not know whom they play game with.  Every process is done sitting in front 
of the computer; and the group member is changed randomly by the 
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computer so there is no chance of considering revenge or long-term 
cooperation.   
 
B. Preferences: Payoff Function 
 
Second treatment of the game is players’ preferences.  There exist three 
kinds of players: A-type who benefits from coordination to A, B-type who 
benefits from coordination to B, and S-type who benefits from coordination 











Type A 50 10 0 
Type B 10 50 0 
Type S 30 30 0 
 
Table 5. Payoff Function 
 
However, in the actual experiment, A, B, and S are replaced with ♧, 
☆, and △, respectively.  This is to prevent the focal point effect: the 
subjects tend to choose the particular option implicitly if the options imply 
any ordinal or superiority.  In the pre-tests, using A, B, and S-type, people 
are evidently choosing option A when they don’t know what to do.  
26 
 
Therefore using symbols without ordinal meaning was important.  However 
using the symbol has drawbacks in that it is difficult for people to recognize 
and tell the difference of.  Therefore the symbol of S-type was selected to 
show its characteristics and the symbol of A and B was selected to reduce 




The experiment was conducted throughout four sessions at the computer lab 
in College of Social Sciences, Seoul National University on December 26 
and 27, 2013.  
 Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 Session 4 
10 periods No communication 
40 periods Two-links Star-in Complete Star-out 
 
Every participant is announced at the time of beginning to receive 
money reward proportional to their total profit in 50 periods plus show-up 
fee, 5,000 KRW afterward.  Students did not know whom they were playing 
game with, and every step of communication was done using the computer 




 When all the participants attended, they received a piece of guideline 
on paper (see Appendix B) and listened to the explanation of the experiment.  
Each period is independent and identical.  When each period begins, the 
computer randomly assigns type ♧, ☆, or △ and subjects play 10 periods 
of decision making battle of the sexes game choosing between ♧ and ☆.  
For the next 40 periods, after participants understanding the process and the 
payoff function, when each period begins, the computer randomly assigns 
type ♧, ☆, or △, and location X, Y, or Z on the network structure.  This 
type and location were kept shown on the monitor screen so that the 
participant could recognize.3  On the communication stage, the players send 
messages ♧ or ☆ as the arrows in the network structure indicate.  Then 
on the next page, they see the message they sent and received.  With this 
information, they choose between ♧ or ☆.  After voting, the result is 
shown; people can see what other players in their group choose.  If all the 
three players in one group choose the same symbol, they receive the payoff.  
If not, they receive nothing.  The exact amount of payoff is as shown on 
Table 5.  When the game finished, the players are announced that they 
would receive 5 times of their total profit of the day plus 5,000 KRW show-
up fee.   
                                         
3 See Appendix A for the monitor screens the participants have seen. 
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By performing this experiment, the following serves as the foundation of the 
research questions.   
 
∙ What kind of network structure can deliver the information most 
effectively?  Would more communication bring much easier 
coordination?   
 
This can be easily verified by comparing no-communication periods with 
other periods with communication stage. According to the previous literature 
and common sense, the coordination rate would much higher in games with 
communication when compared to games without cheap talk.  However, 
since it is three-person game, the rate would be lower than expected when 
compared to in two-person battle of the sexes game.   Overall, coordination 
rate would be different depending on communication network structures.  It 
is predicted that Complete network would score highest success rate because 
the players do know almost full information.  However, since the 
communication is done only once, and talk here is two-way communication, 
there is a possibility of subjects being confused.  In the terms of 
effectiveness, Star-out communication network may be the most effective.  
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There are no possibilities of confusion.  If the group members are 
cooperative enough, the coordination rate can even be 100 %.  This is also 
connected to the second question followed.   
 Also, there is Star-in network.  Star-out network and Star-in 
network look very similar: and here the communication is minimal.  
However, Star-in network may not be the best condition for making 
coordination with various preferences.  In this case, how the players, 
especially the hub with better information would react?  Two-link network 
would be also interesting because they have two-way communication and 
very similar to compete network structure, but how similar would the result 
be?  Would the concentration of information help coordination?  
 
∙ Would the players accept the asymmetrical payoff function and be 
willing to cooperate to the coordination?    
 
In this game, the players have incentives to coordinate in order to maximize 
profit so that they can earn a lot of money as possible after the experiment.  
However, is that the only motivation of the subjects?4  Will they behave as 
the theory rationally expect?   
                                         
4 During the pre-test session when preparing this experiment, many participants 
share their thoughts about the goal of this experiment.  They were aware that it is 
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Previous experimental researchers had the same question.  The 
most famous one about this topic would be the ultimatum game.  
Ultimatum game is a game played by two players, splitting specific amount 
of money.  One person, the proposer, offers the ratio of dividing the money 
to another.  If the second person, the decider, agrees with the ratio of the 
offer, they divide the money according to the proposer’s offer.  However, if 
the decider refuses, both of them cannot earn the money.  In this case, in the 
theoretically rational world, the decider should accept the offer if there exist 
a little amount of profit one can gain.  However, in the real world, many 
people just refuse the offer because they cannot stand the fact that the others 
getting more than themselves (Kahneman et al. 1986; Roth et al. 1991).5  
Individual profit versus Group coordination – is there any difference in the 
result? 
 In this game, the sense of relative deprivation would be less direct 
than in ultimatum game.  However, the subjects can see, after each decision 
making, how much other players in their group earn.  For example, when 
after they exchange the information, assume that one find out that he would 
                                                                                                         
important to cooperate to others when it is evident that changing the choice would 
make everyone in the group better off.  However, some did not want others to get 
more profit than themselves, so they disturb the coordination on purpose sometimes. 
5 This tendency, however, is also affected by the amount of money itself; if the 
amount is huge then people do not want to sacrifice a lot of money because of the 
sentiment of unfairness.  
32 
 
earn 10 points and make the others earn 50 points only if he yield.  Would 
he cooperate?  What about after 10 periods of yielding?  This experiment 
tries to answer this question.   
 
∙ Who is the hub? 
 
The hub means the player can communicate to other players when not 
everyone is connected.  For example, in Two-links network, Y and Z can 
only talk with X.  In Star-out network, X is the only person who can speak 
out.  In Star-in, X cannot send messages but Y and Z tell X something.   
 Then is the hub player more beneficial?  What kind of hub is more 
advantageous, to receive more information or to send more information?  
This became more important in the era of the World Wide Web.  
Traditionally the political expert with more knowledge is literally the one 
who knows more than others.  However, nowadays, it may be the person 
with influence who can affect more in other people’s decision making.  In 
this experiment, the role of the hub, and the effect of its message would be 
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analyzed.  Then importantly, would the preference of the hub change the 
coordination result?   This would also be led to the question: will there be 
any conflict in pursuing individual profit versus group coordination?  
Would all the location in the network structures have similar amount of profit 







1. Coordination Outcomes 
 
Throughout four sessions of experiment, the number of participants attended 
was 87 and 4,270 observation was obtained in total (Table 6). The 
experiment was conducted between December 26th and 27th 2013.  The 
subjects were the undergraduate students in Seoul National University.  In 
each session, the participants were to play 10 periods of none communicating 
game before they play treatment games.  Then they played 40 periods of 
network game.  One network structure is assigned to each session.   
 




1 2 3 4 
No 
communication 
21/210 24/240 21/210 21/210 870 
Two-links 21/840 - - - 840 
Star-in - 24/960 - - 960 
Complete - - 21/840 - 840 
Star-out - - - 21/840 840 
 





Table 7 shows the frequencies of the coordinated actions in the 
whole observations.  The ratio of A and B is almost the same; this would be 
the result of types of the subjects being randomly distributed.  
 
 Freq.(Percent.) 
A 494 (34.07) 
B 492 (33.93) 
Failure 464 (32.00) 
Total 1,450 
 
Table 7. Frequencies of Coordinated Actions 
 
Figure 6 shows coordination success rates by network structures.  
The overall outcome was very similar with what was expected.  As 
expected, games with communication stage show much higher coordination 
rates.  Without any communication before making a decision, the 
coordination rate was 23.45%.  The highest coordination rate was from 
Complete network (97.86%) and players in Star-in network found it most 
difficult to coordinate (50.62%).  However, although the coordination rate 
in Star-in network was the lowest, it was still twice more than under no 
communication.   
The interesting thing is, yet somewhat predictable, the difference of 
coordination rate between Two-links and Star-out network.  It is expected 
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that since Two-links network use one-shot two-way communication, it would 
be harder for participants to decide final choice when the information sent 
and received conflicts.  Yet considering the network structure was a 
common knowledge, the coordination rate should not show such difference, 
because the only factor changing is the information the hub obtains.  This 
might imply that people may not think long enough to consider the structure 
of the network in mind.  There were two possibilities: (a) people think too 
much, and the two-way communication causes confusion, or (b) more 
information help the participants to make the better decision.  
 
 








none complete two-links star-in star-out
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When the players play the game according to the Complete network, 
they had the tendency to follow the action that is equal to majority of 
expressed type (i.e. message).  The players behave almost like under the 
full information status.  This was why, in spite of the confusion of one-shot 
two-way communication, the Complete network showed the highest 
coordination rate.   
 
 
2. Network Structures 
 
Then how can network structures affect the coordination?  Chi-square 
nonparametric test was conducted to examine the effect of network structures 
on coordination rates.  The result is shown in Table 8.  As expected, there 
were significant differences between the actual frequencies of coordination 
and expected ones.  Null hypothesis, that the communication network factor 
is independent from coordination rate, is not adopted because the p-value is 
lower than the level of significance.  Therefore it is evident that network 







Table 8. Chi-Square Nonparametric Test on Coordination Rates 
 
(frequencies, expected frequencies, and chi-square contribution in parenthesis) 
 
  Coordination 
Total 
Model Failure Success 
No 
Communication 
222 68 290 
96.5 (179.9) 197.2 (84.6) 290.0 (264.5) 
Complete 
6 274 280 
96.3 (78.0) 190.4 (36.7) 280.0 (114.7) 
Two-links 
55 225 280 
134.4 (13.4) 190.4 (6.3) 280.0 (19.6) 
Star-in 
158 162 320 
102.4 (30.2) 217.6 (14.2) 320.0 (44.4) 
Star-out 
23 257 280 
89.6 (49.5) 190.4 (23.3) 280.0 (72.8) 
Total 
464 986 1,450 
464.0 (350.9) 986.0 (165.1) 1450.0 (516.1) 
 




3. Type: the Role of the Hub 
 
Can the player in the hub really affect the coordination result?  It was 
predicted that the type of the hub be the crucial factor of the coordination.  
The hub player can be found in the following three network structures: it is 
player at the location X in Two-links, Star-in, and Star-out network.  
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However, the behavior of the hub is different by network structures, because 
the role given is dissimilar.   
In Two-links network, the hub sends and receives a message at the 
same time, so it has more information than others in addition to the ability to 
affect the others.  In this network, Y and Z can also affect X’s behavior too 
by sending messages, but they have lower level of information.  The hub in 
this network seems most powerful.  
In Star-out network, the hub only affects others, and do not have 
more information.  The hub in this network can be thought as either a 
dictator or a public figure with fame (regardless of knowledge or 
intelligence).  They are influential not because they are more clever and 
know better, but because they are popular.   
Lastly, in Star-in network, the hub is the one with higher level of 
information.  The other two players send the hub a message.  The hub has 
better knowledge than other two.  The sad thing is, it has no means to use 
that information.  That is, it cannot exert its influence.      
Table 9 shows the relationship between the type of the hub and the 
result.  Surprisingly, when the type of the hub is A, the coordinated action 
in a group is one hundred percent A.  Also in general, when the type of the 




Table 9. Coordination Rates by Type of the Hub (%) 
 
A. Two-links Network 
 
 Coordinated Action 
Total Type of the 
hub 
A B Failure 
A 100 0 0 100 
B 1.41 76.06 22.54 100 
S 30.54 50.25 19.21 100 
 
 
B. Star-in Network 
 
 Coordinated Action 
Total Type of the 
hub 
A B Failure 
A 100 0 0 100 
B 46.67 9.33 44.00 100 
S 32.50 15.42 52.08 100 
 
 
C. Star-out Network 
 
 Coordinated Action 
Total Type of the 
hub 
A B Failure 
A 100 0 0 100 
B 5.71 84.29 10.00 100 
S 39.22 52.94 7.84 100 
 
 
 However, when it comes to the case of the hub being B, the result 
was slightly different.  The noteworthy thing happened in Star-in network.  
When the hub was A, the group always coordinated to A.  However, if it is 
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B, they succeeded with the possibility about 1/2.  In other networks, the 
difference between the hub being A and being B is pretty close but still, the 
former is always higher. Is this another kind of focal point effect?  It is 
possible because although the ordinal meaning of the action is deleted, the 
screen the players choose the action was all the same, so there still exists the 
possibility of people choosing the first choice when unsure.  This should be 
further looked.  
 Since S-type player has to make a decision what to tell others when 
they has to send a message (A or B does not have to think too much – they 
have no incentive to lie if they fully understand the payoff mechanism), it is 
also important to see the relationship between the message sent by the player 
with type S and the coordinated action in order to verify the role of the hub.  
Table 10 shows what happens when the hub is a swing voter.  The result is 





Table 10. Relationship between the Message from the hub (or X) and the 
Coordinated Action (When the type of the hub is S) 
 
 Coordinated Action 
Total 
Message A B Failure 
A 78.03 8.01 13.96 100 
B 11.79 73.96 14.25 100 
Total 46.09 39.81 14.10 100 
 
A. Two-links Network 
 Coordinated Action 
Total 
Message A B Failure 
A 73.58 9.43 16.98 100 
B 12.07 68.97 18.97 100 
Total 35.36 46.43 18.21 100 
 
B. Star-out Network 
 Coordinated Action 
Total 
Message A B Failure 
A 95.24 0 4.76 100 
B 0.00 90.00 10.00 100 
Total 39.22 52.94 7.84 100 
 
Then below is the table showing the relationship between type of the 
participants and the final choice.  Considering the payoff function, it is 
reasonable for players to want the equilibrium be their own type.  Here, the 
famous problem with the Ultimatum game mentioned above again arises.  
Will people behave rationally?  
 In this experiment, will people choose to gain absolute profit not 
considering unfair outcome of receiving less than others?  There is no other 
incentive for players to choose the action other than their own type if it is not 
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for coordination.  “Switching” in the (Table 11) means that the player 
chooses the action which is not their type.   
 When the participants have to make a decision without any 
communication, there were still 18.62% people choosing other actions. 
When it comes to Complete network, the rate arises.  Two-links network 
and Star-out network shows incredibly high rate of switching.  However, 
Star-in network, compared to no communication, shows low rate of 
switching.   
 
Table 11. Relationship between Type of the Participants and the Final Choice 
(%) 
 




Type A B 
A 84.48 15.52 100 
18.62 
B 21.72 78.28 100 
S 68.28 31.72 100 - 
Total 58.16 41.84 100 - 
 




Type A B 
A 79.64 20.36 100 
27.50 
B 34.64 65.36 100 
S 66.07 33.93 100 - 










Type A B 
A 32.50 67.50 100 
44.64 
B 21.79 78.21 100 
S 44.29 55.71 100 - 
Total 32.86 67.14 100 - 
 
 




Type A B 
A 94.06 5.94 100 
14.68 
B 23.44 76.56 100 
S 68.44 31.56 100 - 
Total 61.98 38.02 100 - 
 




Type A B 
A 39.64 60.36 100 
42.67 
B 25.00 75.00 100 
S 41.43 58.57 100 - 







Figure 7. Switching Rates when the subjects’ type is A or B (%) 
 
 
The interesting thing is, almost half of the participants change their 
choice and yet the coordination rate is very high in the Two-links network.  
Star-out network also shows the high rate of changing and coordination 
success, but this is not surprising because in this network, the coordinated 
equilibrium is unilaterally given by the hub.  Yet, in Two-links network, the 
feature of communication being two-way was thought to confuse people but 
it turns out that it did not.  The subjects were surely following the message 







none complete two-links star-in star-out
46 
 
Therefore these results draw two inferences.  First, people tend to 
follow others message than thought.  This means that people regard 
coordination important although it conflicts with the desire to be relatively 
successful.  Second, without any information on “right” decision, people 
tend to change their decision.   
 
4. Coordination Success versus Social Profit 
 
 We have mainly seen the result in a perspective of a group: is it 
coordinated or not?  However, as the level of individuals, the amount of 
profit might matter more.  Table 12 shows the frequencies of profit the 
players earn by network structures.  The result mainly goes with the 
coordination success rate.  However, although in coordination rate, 
Complete network and Star-out network was pretty close, the distribution of 
profit is far different.  In Complete network, there are few 0 points and a lot 
of 50 points.  This means there are many players succeeded to make others 
vote for them under open information.  In Star-out network, there are some 
0 points, and similar amount of 10, 30, and 50 points.   
 Then how the profit distributed among players themselves?  Figure 
8 and 9 compare average profit produced within networks with the profit of 
the hub (location X).  This shows that it is more advantageous to have the 
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opportunity to speak out rather than have the information of others’ type 



















none complete two-links star-in star-out
 Network 
Total 




0 666 18 165 474 69 1,392 
10 34 152 190 60 226 662 
30 73 276 229 147 263 988 
50 97 394 256 279 282 1,308 






Figure 9. Average Profit of the Player at the Location X 
 
 
Table 13 shows what happened to the message-senders.  In 
Complete network, everyone sends message.  Here, the dominant strategy is 
to keep the content of the message.  This is understandable because the 
others have the same information.  However, in the case of type S, it is 
especially important to keep their message – this is when the S has the 
casting vote.  In Two-links network, it is noteworthy that changing is the 
dominant action.  This is because when the information is shared, the one 










none complete two-links star-in star-out
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change can make the profit this much when it is only one-shot 
communication.   
 In Star-in network, in fact, the sender has no special reason to 
change their choice because the information status before sending the 
message and before making a decision is the same.  However, more than 80 
cases people change and earn 50 points.  This does not happen in 10 or 30 
points.  In Star-out network, also, it is thought to be advantageous to keep 
the message, because it would be the only information to the receivers.  




Table 13. Relationship between Changing the Choice and Profit 
 
A. Complete Network 
 
 Do not Change Change Total 
0 10 8 18 
10 95 57 152 
30 182 94 276 
50 218 176 394 
Total 505 335 840 
 
 
B. Two-links Network 
 
 Do not Change Change Total 
0 69 96 165 
10 42 148 190 
30 99 130 229 
50 66 190 256 
Total 276 564 840 
 
C. Star-in Network 
 
 Do not Change Change Total 
0 158 158 316 
10 22 3 25 
30 28 4 32 
50 186 81 276 
Total 394 246 640 
 
D. Star-out Network 
 
 Do not Change Change Total 
0 4 19 23 
10 4 0 4 
30 80 108 188 
50 6 59 65 
Total 276 564 280 
 







This research was designed and conducted in order to examine the role of 
cheap talk communication in decision making process, especially when 
people have to make a decision collectively.  When the decision making is 
done at the individual level, as the previous studies has asserted, it is 
important to obtain information needed at the lowest cost as possible.  
Therefore people rely on information shortcuts, because it is rather cheaper 
to gain secondary information interpreted from the media or from the 
acquaintances.  In this case, the people having huge amount of knowledge 
or available shortcuts would have advantage.  However, when it comes to 
group decision, and when my possibilities of gaining profit is also depending 
on other’s choice, the situation changes.  Rather than information itself, the 
way information is delivered become more important.  This is the point this 
research tried to suggest: the importance of information sharing networks to 
making decision.   
 At the social level, therefore, it is important to make an effective and 
fair route of communication network in order to ensure that social decision is 
made on the basis of enough information.  Otherwise, when the hub of the 
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network is not the expert and have enough knowledge, the group decision 
would be an inferior one compared to full information equivalent.   
 
2. Further Discussion 
 
Nowadays, sometimes it has been more important to become influential than 
to know more.  Especially when it comes to general voters not policy 
makers, the significant matter would be to secure a communication line by 
which the information is equally disseminate.   
 Can internet be our effective public sphere in new era to accomplish 
this purpose?  Some theorists have been suspicious of potential possibilities 
of the Internet.  In their opinion, the Internet only increases the probability 
of selective exposure, so that people would expose themselves only to like-
minded perspectives and this leads to fragmentation and polarization in 
society (Stroud 2010; Sunstein 2009).  
Political polarization, as the consequence of coordination failure, is 
suggested by many scholars as the result of online deliberation.  Regarding 
political polarization nowadays, there seems to exist an agreement that 
political elites being polarized; but there are debates on polarization of the 
public.  Jacobson (2003) insists that the Iraq war encourage the separation 
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of ideological partisans.  Abramowitz and Saunders (2008) also suggest that 
polarization of the public is getting serious.6   
Based on these polarization arguments, studies arrange polarization 
with new media. Iyengar and Hahn (2009) there exists ideological 
polarization due to self-selective news media use. Yet Mutz and Martin 
(2001) showed findings that consumption of news media in 2000s increase 
the exposure to various political interests. 
Since the social network services have been widespread, there are 
studies, especially on Twitter, working on this. Conover et al. (2011) explore 
how social media shape the networked public sphere and facilitate 
communication between communities with different political orientations. In 
their study on Twitter, They separates mention network from retweet network. 
The network of political retweets exhibits a highly segregated partisan 
structure, with extremely limited connectivity between left- and right- 
leaning users. However, in the case for the user-to-user mention network, 
which is dominated by a single politically heterogeneous cluster of users in 
which ideologically-opposed individuals interact at a much higher rate 
compared to the network of retweets. 
                                         
6 However, there are scholars like Fiorina (2011) insisting that the electorate is 
being more independent; they become more tolerant and non- partisan. 
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Kim (2011) examines that SNSs contribute to individuals’ exposure 
to cross-cutting political views. He proposed that SNSs contribute to 
expanding exposure to dissimilar political views across individuals‟ 
partisanship.  Yardi and Boyd (2010) proved homophily and group 
polarization on Twitter: replies between like-minded individuals strengthen 
group identity, whereas replies between different-minded individuals 
reinforce in-group and out-group affiliation. They suggest that people are 
exposed to broader viewpoints than before, but limited to engage in 
meaningful discussion, and coordination.  
Therefore the future task of new media research would be to find the 
way to reduce polarization and extremity and make cyberspace the area that 
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B. Sample Instructions (Session 01) 
 
 
 [실험 안내 ]                  1: 2013  12 월 26 일 
 
 
늘 실험에 참가해주  감사합니다. 여러분  지 부  개인들 간  
사소통과 사결  연구 는 실험에 참여 시게 니다. 실험 소요 
시간  약  시간입니다. 
 
실험 도  폰  롯  개인용 자  사용  지 며, 실
험이 시작  후에는 간에 자리를 이동 거나 실험실  나가실  
없습니다.  실험 도  타인과 거나 신 를 보내는 등  사
소통도 실  없습니다. 이  꼭 지 시 를 부탁드립니다. 실험 
도 에 질 이 있 신 경우에는 언 라도 손  들어 도움  요청해 주십





- 타입, 조  
 
실험이 시작 면 여러분  컴퓨 에 해 ♧, ☆, △ 타입  나 게 
니다. 참가자들  자신  타입만  알  있  뿐, 다른 사람  타입  
알지 못합니다.  
이후 컴퓨 는 여러분  작  3명  나  조  편  것입니다. 
가 같  조에 편 었는지는 알  없습니다. 이 조는 매 회 작  
변 합니다. 라  여러분  계속 새 운 사람들과  조가 지만 상
 알 는 없습니다.  
 
- 사결  
 






- 결과   
 
같  조  3명이 모  같  택지를 고르면 여러분  10  얻습니다. 
이 , ♧ 타입인 사람  사람들이 모  ♧를 택  경우 40  보
스를 얻습니다. ☆ 타입인 사람  사람들이 모  ☆를 택  경우 40
 보 스를 얻습니다.  
 
※ 라  ♧ 타입  사결  결과가 ♧일 경우 50 , ☆일 경우 10
 얻게 니다. ☆ 타입  사결  결과가 ☆일 경우 50 , ♧일 경우 
10  얻게 니다.  
편 △ 타입  ♧, ☆에 상 없이 3명이  택지를 고르 만 면 30
 얻습니다. 






- 타입, , 조  
 
실험이 시작 면 여러분  컴퓨 에 해 ♧, ☆, 는 △ 타입  
나 게 니다. 컴퓨 는 여러분  작  3 명  나  조  
편 합니다. 마찬가지  가 같  조에 편 었는지, 타입이 
엇인지는 알  없습니다. 이 조는 매 회 작  변 합니다.  
 
그리고 이 단계에  여러분  각각 왼쪽 그림에  
가, 나, 다  나  를 게 니다. 이 





- 사소통  
 
여러분  같  조  상 에게 ♧ 는 ☆라는 시지를 보낼  있습
니다. 시지는 살  향  달 며 시지  내용   사람만 
인   있습니다. 시지를  사람  그 시지를 고 사결 에 
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참고   있습니다. 그러나 시지를 ‘♧’라고 보내도 얼마든지 ‘☆’
를 택 는 일이 가능 다는  염 에 시  랍니다.  
 
- 사결  
 
여러분  ♧ 는 ☆를 택 게 니다(40회 복).  
 
- 결과   
 
1단계에  같습니다. 즉, 같  조  3명이 모  같  택지를 고르면 
♧ 타입  결과가 ♧일 경우 50 , ☆일 경우 10  얻게 니다. ☆ 
타입  사결  결과가 ☆일 경우 50 , ♧일 경우 10  얻게 니다.  
편 △ 타입  ♧, ☆에 상 없이 3명이  택지를 고르 만 면 30
 얻습니다. 






사회 구 원들  여러 가지 부 에  끊임없이 집합  사결  
를 만나게 고, 이러  사결  과 에  보는 매우 결 인 
역  다. 그러나 권자들마다 가지고 있는 존 보  양이 다르며, 
새 운 보를 얻  해 요  는 용도 천차만별이  에 많  
사람들  직 인 보원 부  보를 집 고 이를 분 는 
용  들이는 고를 보다는 주변 사람들과  사소통과 같  
식  간  보를 손쉽게 얻고자 다. 그러나 지 지 
에  사소통  통  보 습득 과 에  연구는 뜨거운 
언 과  심에 여 조사나 내용분 과 같  인 
식 만 연구 어 다.  
그리 여 본 연구에 는 행태주  게임이 에 입각  실험연구 법  
용 여 사소통 연결망과 집합  사결 에  연구를 진행 다. 
실험연구 식  택함 써 존  데이  분 만 는 히  
어 웠  보  사결 간  인과 계나 행 자  략  택, 그리고 
사소통  식과 향 이 집합  사결  결과에 미 는 향 등  
직  분 고자  것이다. 구체  본 연구에  살펴보고자 는 
것  칭 인 보상황에  게임 경 자들이 보를 주고 는 
사소통 연결망  구조  향 이 달라짐에 라 사소통  지 
않  는 어떻게 다른 사결  내리는가  이다.  
본 실험에  참가자들  3인이  조  작  편 어 A 는 B를 
택 는 결 게임  실시 다. 여 에   다른 보  함 를 
갖는 행 자  타입과, 사  사소통    있는 트워크 구조가 
처 (treatment)  용 었다. 그리 여 어떠  트워크 구조가 가장 
효과  행 자들  를 고 보등가에 가 운 집합  
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결  내리게 해  것인지를 알아보고자 다.  
  실험 결과는 이  과 체  들어맞는 결  보여주었다. 
참가자들  자신이 상   이득  얻 라도 집단 결 에 
조 인 태도를 보 고, 여러 사람과 보를 는 “허 (hub)” 
에 있는 행 자  말  체  잘 랐다. 라   많  
사소통  체   많  조  공  가 다. 그런데 사결  
차원  개인  차원과 집단  차원  나 어 보았  , 집단  
차원에  조  공  이루어내  해 는 보를 다른 사람에게 
효과  달   있는 사소통 구조를 보 는 것이 요했다. 
라  존  통 과 같이  많  보를 효과 ,  용  
취득 는 것뿐만 아니라 자신에게 리  보를 타인에게 퍼뜨릴  
있는 능 이 보  결과에 가장 요  향  미쳤다. 이러  결과는 
인 과  달  통해 사소통이 훨씬 자 워진 사회에  
드시 고  보가 사결  좌우 는 것  아니라는  시사 며, 
보다 람직  사회  차원에  사결  해  곡 지 않  
사소통 통 를 만드는 것  요  상 시  다.   
 
주요어: 조 , 결 게임, 사소통 트워크, 실험연구 
번: 2012-20199 
 
 
 
 
 
